The 1990s have seen a strong surge in the number of cross-border regions all over Western and Eastern Europe. The article analyses the emergence of these local cross-border institutions in public governance by addressing their context, dimensions and causal underpinnings. First, it offers a brief background on the history of cross-border regions in Europe and related EU policies to support them. Second, it provides a conceptual definition of crossborder regions and their various forms and positions within the wider context of other transnational regional networks. Third, it analyses the empirical dimensions of European cross-border regions, including their frequency, geographic distribution and development over time. It concludes by linking cross-border regions and their various forms to institutional conditions in specific countries as well as the effects of European regional policy. It is argued that small-scale cross-border regions have flourished in particular because of their increasingly relevant role as implementation units for European regional policy in a context of multi-level governance.
There are more than 70 cross-border regions in Europe today, operating under names such as 'Euroregions', 'Euregios' or 'Working Communities'. Although some of these initiatives date back to the 1950s, the 1990s saw a large increase in cross-border regions (CBRs) all over Europe. In fact, today there are virtually no local or regional authorities in border areas that are not somehow involved in cross-border co-operation (CBC) initiatives.
(1) The European Commission supports these initiatives with approximately €700m per year, complemented by a similar amount by European nation states. These stylized facts indicate that CBRs deserve some attention in terms of their empirical significance, given the recent boom of CBC as well as the growing involvement of the EU authorities. They also seem to validate the qualitative evidence put forward under labels such as neoregionalism (Balme, 1996b) , the New Regionalism (Keating, 1998; MacLeod, 2001) or the Europe 'with' the regions (Kohler-Koch et al., 1998) . On a global level, Jessop (2002) illustrates various different ways in which CBRs have emerged and investigates their scalar implications in terms of institutional orders and strategic capacity-building. Moreover, an increasing number of cross-border co-operation initiatives have been subject to case studies in the literature. Numerous authors have produced a wealth of work in various disciplines such as geography, political science, international relations, administrative science and sociology. However, a considerable part of the literature has strong normative inflections, arguing that by cooperating with their cross-border counterparts, local and regional communities can emancipate themselves vis-à-vis nation-state dominance (Cappellin, 1992; Murphy, 1993; Gonin, 1994) . As a result, these works tend to neglect the empirical analysis of actual cases and concentrate on normative prescriptions. The more empirically focused literature makes useful contributions to the study of single cases from various disciplinary perspectives (Beck, 1997: 118; Scott, 1998; Church and Reid, 1999; Blatter, 2001; Perkmann and Sum, 2002) . However, the overall picture tends to remain opaque. As Anderson, a long-standing scholar of borders and border regions, notes, research agendas are more common than precisely formulated arguments and clear conclusions (Anderson, 1997) . This article attempts to fill a noticeable gap in the literature by addressing three main issues. First, it aims to clarify what CBRs are exactly and how this type of international co-operation relates to other ways of international involvement of noncentral governments (NCGs) in Europe. Because of the multi-disciplinary and therefore fragmented nature of the literature, a variety of concepts have been put forward, making it difficult to grasp the significance of the many types of cross-border cooperation initiatives. Second, on the basis of the conceptual clarifications put forward, the article intends to shed some light on the actual empirical significance of the CBR phenomenon in Europe as a whole. This includes the simple, but yet unanswered questions of how many initiatives there are and what characteristics they have. This serves to develop a macro-view on CBC which complements the microperspectives that are dominant in the literature. Third, a few hypotheses on the determinants of CBC are put forward, both in terms of the impact of nation-state-specific variables as well as the role of EU policy-making in simultaneously promoting and shaping CBC. In terms of methodology, the article adopts a mix of quantitative analysis, primary case study research and secondary evidence provided by the case study literature. I created a directory of European CBRs that constitutes the core of the quantitative evidence, while interpretive judgement is provided by my case study research over the period 1998-2000. A total of 42 interviews with individuals involved both in CBC initiatives and EU regional policy were carried out. Additional evidence was gathered from secondary material as well as policy documents published by CBC bodies. The arguments are presented in the following order. The introductory section offers an overview on CBC in Europe today and its supranational context. Subsequently, a definition of CBC is developed by synthesizing the main characteristics of CBC as provided by the evidence. From this, the notion of 'cross-border region' is derived, with particular emphasis put on its various forms and manifestations. To locate CBC activities in a wider context of interregional co-operation, their relationship to other types of such activities is explained. In the second main section, the concepts are related to the empirical evidence primarily through an analysis of the database of CBRs compiled for this study. This serves to determine the overall patterns of European CBC, including its actual incidence, geographic distribution, etc. The article concludes with two main hypotheses on those factors that facilitate CBC, in particular the role of nation-specific institutions and EU regional policy.
Introduction: cross-border regions and their supranational context
The first 'official' CBR, the EUREGIO, was established in 1958 on the Dutch-German border, in the area of Enschede (NL) and Gronau (DE). Since then, such 'Euroregions' and other forms of cross-border co-operation have developed throughout Europe. Today, in more than 70 cases, municipalities and regional authorities cooperate with their counterparts across the border in more or less formalized organizational arrangements. For local and regional authorities, engaging in CBC means they enter a field long reserved for central state actors. For dealing with issues such as local cross-border spatial planning or transport policy, in the 1960s and 1970s various bi-lateral and multilateral governmental commissions were established without granting access to local authorities (Aykaç, 1994) . But over the last 30 years the scope for NCGs to co-operate across borders has widened considerably. To a large degree, this can be related to macroregional integration in Europe. In particular, two supranational bodies, the Council of Europe (2) and the European Union, were important for improving the conditions under which NCGs could co-operate across borders. Whereas the Council of Europe has been particularly active in improving the legal situation, the European Commission provides substantial financial support for CBC initiatives. Legally, the idea of an administrative body in charge of a subnational cross-border area is relatively difficult to implement. The first CBRs were based on agreements with varying degrees of formality and mostly relied on good will. The classical form of these mostly small-scale arrangements along the Rhine axis is the 'twin association': on each side of the border, municipalities and districts form an association according to a legal form suitable within their own national legal systems. In a second step, the associations then join each other on the basis of a cross-border agreement to establish the CBR. In 1980, on the initiative of the Council of Europe, a set of European countries concluded an international treaty, the so-called Madrid Convention, as a first step towards CBC structures based on public law. The convention has been signed by 20 countries and was recently updated with two Additional Protocols (Dolez, 1996) . It provides a legal framework for completing bi-and multinational agreements for public law CBC among NCGs. Examples of such agreements are the BENELUX Cross-border Convention of 1989 and the German-Dutch cross-border treaty of 1991. For instance, the Euroregion Rijn-Waal on the DutchGerman border has been one such cross-national public body since 1993. However, the decisions put forward by such agencies are binding only on the public authorities within the cross-border area concerned and not on civil subjects (Denters et al., 1998) . In Scandinavia, CBC has been promoted since the 1950s when the Nordic Council was founded. The 'Treaty of Co-operation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden' (Treaty of Helsingfors) in 1962 provided a basis for cooperation in legal, cultural, social, economic, transport and environmental matters (Malchus, 1986: 44 Interreg subsidizes local cross-border projects undertaken collaboratively by local authorities and other organizations located in adjoining border areas. The objective is to develop cross-border social and economic centres through common development strategies, with eligible projects being required to have a structural economic benefit to the border area. The allocation of funds is governed by Steering Committees involving local actors as well as higher level authorities such as central states and/or regions from the participating countries. As Interreg is by far the most important source of funding for most CBC initiatives, they must comply with the modalities set out in the EU regulations. Therefore, effectively, many CBRs function as implementation agencies for this specific type of transnational regional policy (Perkmann, 2002a) . As Interreg funds can only be allocated within EU territory, the European Commission has created instruments to support CBC in Eastern Europe. For the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), a programme called Phare CBC provides funding within the general context of Phare, the programme established to implement the EU's 'preaccession strategy'. A similar arrangement exists for the Newly Independent States (NIS) eligible for the Tacis programme (Tacis CBC), notably Russia. A multi-country grant scheme called 'Credo' promotes CBC projects between CEECs and NIS border regions. These initiatives have had a considerable effect on encouraging Eastern European authorities to seek international co-operation, although in many cases national authorities retained strong control over the type and direction of projects. It is symptomatic of European integration in the post-war period that the more legalistic approach favoured by the Council of Europe -proposing CBRs as formal politico-administrative entitieswas later abandoned in favour of a more pragmatic and economically oriented approach within the context of EU regional policy.
A conceptual exploration: cross-border co-operation and cross-border regions Given the recent proliferation of inter-local and inter-regional activities, sometimes subsumed under the label of 'neo-regionalism' (Balme, 1996b) , what precisely are cross-border regions? To answer this question, this section aims to develop a conceptual definition of both CBC and, subsequently, CBRs. This will serve, first, to designate those cases that actually constitute CBRs and second, to differentiate those cases from other, related, forms of co-operation between regions.
As a first approximation, cross-border cooperation can be defined as a more or less institutionalized collaboration between contiguous subnational authorities across national borders. However, for practical and research purposes, this loose definition needs to be operationalized. This must consider those factors which are empirically important for constituting the phenomenon and distinguish it from other phenomena. It should also be able to accommodate differences among CBC initiatives, concerning their administrative set-up, the type of public authorities involved, and the sources/modes of finance (Groß and SchmittEgner, 1994; Hassink et al., 1995) . CBC can thus be defined according to the four following criteria: First, as its main protagonists are always public authorities, CBC must be located in the realm of public agency. Second, CBC refers to a collaboration between subnational authorities in different countries whereby these actors are normally not legal subjects according to international law. (4) They are therefore not allowed to conclude international treaties with foreign authorities, and, consequently, CBC involves so-called 'low politics'. This is why CBC is often based on informal or 'quasi-juridical' arrangements among the participating authorities. Third, in substantive terms, CBC is foremost concerned with practical problem-solving in a broad range of fields of everyday administrative life. Fourth, CBC involves a certain stabilization of cross-border contacts, i.e. institution-building, over time. This definition of cross-border co-operation is more specific than the definition proposed by an important international legal framework, the 'Madrid Convention' of the Council of Europe. The Convention defines 'transfrontier co-operation' as 'any concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between territorial communities and authorities within the jurisdiction of other Contracting parties and the conclusion of any agreement and arrangement necessary for this purpose'. (5) The definition of CBC proposed here is inductively derived through empirical generalization, avoiding any strong assumptions on the essence of 'regions' or 'border communities'. Such assumptions are, for instance, implicit in Schmitt-Egner's definition of 'cross-border cooperation' as 'cross-border interaction between neighbouring regions for the preservation, governance and development of their common living space, without the involvement of their central authorities ' (Schmitt-Egner, 1998: 63, my translation) . This definition assumes that there is an a priori common living space, while the evidence suggests that in many cases such common purposes are constructed by border communities in an ad hoc manner.
What are cross-border regions?
When does CBC generate a 'cross-border region'? The relevant literature reveals several connotations of 'CBR'. The definition adopted by the Council of Europe, for instance, states that cross-border regions are 'characterised by homogenous features and functional interdependencies because otherwise there is no need for cross-border co-operation' (CoE, 1972: 29) . In other words, a 'transfrontier region is a potential region, inherent in geography, history, ecology, ethnic groups, economic possibilities and so on, but disrupted by the sovereignty of the governments ruling on each side of the frontier' (CoE, 1995) . (6) Concepts such as 'natural economic spaces' and 'natural economic territories' (Scalapino, 1991) point in a similar direction, implicitly arguing for the existence of intermediate units of 'natural' economic development cutting through state borders (Ohmae, 1995) . Such characterizations can be traced back to the concept of 'functional regions' (Schamp, 1995) , i.e. territorial units characterized by a high density of internal interactions compared to the level of interactions outside. The 'functional region' is an important conceptual tool in spatial planning as it provides empirically grounded criteria for policy interventions. Functional regions are areas grouped together on the basis of the interactions between them (Berry, 1969) . In other words, they have 'empirical boundaries' qua socio-economic systems as demonstrated by certain quantitative indicators such as transport volumes and directions or telephone calls (Merritt, 1974) . The CoE refers to the region as a functional entity because early CBC policies were significantly informed by spatial planning theories and practices. However, for a social analysis of CBRs, such a definition has limited utility. It would be inappropriate to assume that CBRs emerge due to their 'potential regionness', defined in functional terms. Sociologically, this would fail to ground the emergence of CBRs in social action. As SchmittEgner notes, a cross-border region is not only an 'action space' but also an action unit (Schmitt-Egner, 1998: 37) . A similar action-centred line is taken by Raich, who defines a cross-border region as a territorial unit 'that has historical, socio-economic and cultural commonalties, as well as, at least tentatively, its own regional identity and autonomous [political and social] institutions and therefore claims an autonomous definition of its needs and interests which it is capable to articulate and defend ' (Raich, 1995: 25) . Comprehensive definitions such as the latter reflect the ambition to produce an ultimate definition of the 'region'. Such a-prioristic, nominalist approaches are rejected here as they do not necessarily support empirical analysis. To know whether a given object is a region or not according to a nominalist definition provides no insight into the regularities governing it. The point here is that the 'regionness' of a CBR cannot be taken for granted but has to be understood as the outcome of a process of social construction. Accordingly, a cross-border region can be defined as a bounded territorial unit composed of the territories of authorities participating in a CBC initiative as defined above. This implies that a CBR is not only understood as a functional space, but as a socio-territorial unit equipped with a certain degree of strategic capacity on the basis of certain organizational arrangements. So far the concept parallels the definitions proposed by Schmitt-Egner and Raich. But the existence of 'commonalities' is not a necessary element of a CBR. This means one can agree with Anderson and O'Dowd's pragmatic observation that 'regions that straddle state borders' can be understood as territorial units for which 'regional unity may derive from the use of the border to exploit, legally and illegally, funding opportunities or differentials in wages, prices and institutional norms on either side of the border' (Anderson and O'Dowd 1999: 595) . In conclusion, it does not matter whether a CBR is built upon cultural or ethnic commonalities, a common historical background, existing functional interdependencies or a mere community of interests, as it is precisely the process of construction that matters. Only if commonalities are not assumed to underpin CBC initiatives can the contingent nature of CBRs be grasped. Nonetheless, the discursive dimension of CBRs will usually be dominated by an assemblage of 'common' cultural, ethnic or economic elements. But there is no necessary or 'natural' foundation for any CBR, as the precise articulation of commonalities (or differences) will always derive from a historically specific process of social construction. For example, the CBC initiatives on the German-Polish border are built on a 'common' history of complete alienation although the discourses employed still manage to articulate a wide range of commonalities.
CBRs in the wider context of international regional co-operation
The literature points to a growing number of regional and local authorities engaging in international co-operation. As noted by students of the 'New Regionalism' in international relations theory, the building of the EU as a macro-region contributes to a blurring of the distinction between what is 'international' and 'internal' politics (Hettne, 1994; Joenniemi, 1997) . Several tendencies have been identified. First, researchers have noted the growing 'Europeanization' of local and regional governments as they are recruited as 'partners' into various EU policy fields (Goldsmith, 1993; Balme, 1996a) . Second, NCGs play an increasing role in formulating foreign and/or EU policy of nationstates (Hocking, 1996) . Third, an increasing number of NCGs in Europe are involved in 'interregional and cross-border co-operation' (ICC). ICC initiatives comprise direct contact among NCGs that bypass superior levels of government, a process for which the notion of 'paradiplomacy' has been used (Duchacek et al., 1988) . CBC essentially constitutes a special case of this latter type of regional activity. Therefore, before the various forms of CBC are elaborated, it is useful to relate CBC to other forms of stable international contacts between non-central governments. Types of ICC can be derived from a cross-tabulation of two dimensions: the geographical scope of the cooperation initiative, and the condition of contiguity, i.e. whether the territories of the co-operating partners are geographically contiguous (see Table 1 ). Cases of contiguous co-operation fall under the category of 'cross-border co-operation' while noncontiguous, 'long-distance' interaction is referred to as 'interregional co-operation'. Two types of this latter type can be distinguished: interregional networks and peak organizations. Among interregional networks, according to the type of the public authorities involved, inter-urban and interregional networks (stricto sensu) can be identified. Some of these networks were established in the course of proactive bi-or multilateral initiatives pursued by single regions or groups of regions. The best known example is the 'Four Motors for Europe' (Borras, 1993; Raich, 1995) , but other co-operation initiatives exist, such as that between Hessen and Emilia Romagna or between Emilia Romagna and the Basque country (Groupe de recherche, 1996) . Many of these networks emerged due to the incentives provided by EU networking policies and are therefore likely to break apart after funding support terminates (Leonardi, 1995; Benington and Harvey, 1998) . However, some of them have functioned as incubators for more permanent networks. For instance, after EU funding ran out, the cities and regions co-operating in the COAST network succeeded in obtaining further financial support from another EU source and recruiting further coastal resorts whose membership fees would sustain the core organization. (7) Trans-European peak associations with widespread NCG membership constitute a second type of interregional co-operation. An example is provided by the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) that was granted the management of a European programme (ECOS/OUVERTURE). Other transnational associations include the Assembly of European Regions (Sänger, 1997) , the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) and the Association of Regions of Traditional Industry (Bullmann, 1996: 13-14) . These associations attempt to represent their members' interests on the European level and also act as service organizations with a high level of expertise in regional and urban matters. Consequently, they also act as information/service providers and programme managers for the Commission, and function as network brokers providing a forum for members to seek potential partner regions or cities. Empirically, the boundaries between interregional co-operation and the peak associations tend to be blurred. For instance, the 'Eurocities' grouping, an interregional co-operation network, has also become a strong lobbying organization on the European level, representing an aggregate population of over 60m (Müller, 1997) . 
Exploring different types of CBRs
As noted earlier, CBC refers to co-operation arrangements between contiguous territorial authorities, resulting in the emergence of CBRs. However, given the wide variation in CBRs, a more precise conceptual grid is needed. At least three dimensions are relevant:
• geographical scope: small-scale CBC initiatives can be distinguished from Working Communities that usually involve five or more regions.
• co-operation intensity: referring to the strategic capacity gained by the cross-border body and its degree of autonomy vis-à-vis central state and other authorities.
• type of actors: local (municipal) authorities can be distinguished from regional ('meso-level') authorities. Regarding the geographical scope, small-scale initiatives such as the EUREGIO can be distinguished from larger groupings, such as the classic form of the Working Communities. The latter -most of which were founded between 1975 and 1985 -emerge from co-operation between several regions forming large areas that can stretch over several nation states ('multi-lateral cross-border co-operation'). Examples are the Arge Alp (Kicker, 1995) , the Alpes-Adria, the Working Community of the Western Alps (COTRAO), the Working Community of the Pyrenees or the Atlantic Arc. Their organizational structures usually consist of a general assembly, an executive committee, thematic working groups and secretariats (Aykaç, 1994: 12-14) , but activities tend to be confined to common declarations and information exchange. However, some groupings, such as the Atlantic Arc, succeeded in obtaining European funds (Balme et al., 1996) . Small-scale initiatives are referred to as microCBRs in this article. Many of these smaller groupings tend to call themselves Euroregions but the usage of the term is not consistent enough to justify its use as an analytical category. Although the term was originally employed for a very specific cooperation arrangement, it was later extended to a broader range of initiatives. For instance, the 'Carpathian Euroregion' is more a Working Community than a Euroregion in the original sense. Hence, for the sake of clarity, I suggest using the term 'micro-CBR' for referring to small-scale cooperation arrangements among contiguous border authorities belonging to different nation states. (8) This form of co-operation has a long tradition in certain areas of post-war Europe, especially on the Germany-BENELUX border where it was 'invented' under the expressions 'Euroregion' or 'Euregio'. Organizationally, micro-CBRs usually have a council, a presidency, subject-matter oriented working groups and a common secretariat. Thus, the term can refer both to a territorial unit, made of the aggregate territories of the participating authorities, and to organizational entities, usually the secretariat or management unit. Legally, the cooperation can take different forms, ranging from legally non-binding arrangements to public-law bodies. The spatial extension of micro-CBRs will usually range between 50 and 100km in width; and they tend to be inhabited by a few million inhabitants. In most cases, the participating authorities are local authorities, although in other cases regional or district authorities are involved. Occasionally, third organizations, such as regional development agencies, interest associations and chambers of commerce, have become official members. The organizational set-up can also differ from the original model inspired by the Dutch-German EUREGIO (Perkmann, 2002b) . Thus, the term micro-CBR is used to refer to CBC groupings that operate on a smaller geographical scale regardless of their precise organizational set-up or the nature of the participating actors. To introduce a further way of discriminating different types of CBRs, the second dimension noted above is useful: the term 'co-operation intensity' refers to the degree to which the crossborder bodies have gained autonomy vis-à-vis the single participating authorities. To take an example from International Relations, a federation would have a higher co-operation intensity than a confederation of states, and the EU would have a higher co-operation intensity than NAFTA. For estimating the co-operation intensity of existing CBC arrangements, a catalogue of criteria proposed by the AEBR can be used (AEBR and European Commission, 1997: B2 10): • co-operation based on some type of legal arrangement, common permanent secretariat controlling its own resources; • existence of an explicitly documented development strategy; • broad scope of co-operation in multiple policy areas, similar to conventional local or regional authorities. In what follows, I will refer to the small-scale version of such cases with high co-operation intensity as 'integrated' micro-CBRs, whereas the large-scale version is named 'Scandinavian groupings', as this type of model can predominantly be found in the Nordic countries. In turn, rather loose co-operation arrangements without a permanent secretariat, development plans and comprehensive co-operation schemes are characterized as 'emerging' microCBRs if they are small-scale, and Working Communities if they are large-scale. Finally, a third dimension for distinguishing CBRs concerns the nature of the participating authorities. Empirically, most of the small-scale initiatives involve local authorities as the driving protagonists whereas large-scale CBC is almost exclusively driven by regional authorities. This is rather trivial, but a second factor is important here, i.e. the large variance in the territorial organization of the European nation states. For instance, in Germany, local administration comprises two levels, the municipalities and the Kreise, with the latter being self-governed groupings of municipalities. In most cases, the Kreise are the driving force behind CBC initiatives. By contrast, in Italy, it is meso-level authorities, the province (provinces), that are usually involved in CBC initiatives while the municipalities play a minor role because of their relative fragmentation compared to the German Kreise. In Scandinavia, as for instance in the Øresund region, both counties and large urban municipalities (Greater Copenhagen) participate in the cooperation arrangement (Maskell and Törnqvist, 1999) . In general, in countries with a strong role for inter-municipal associations, CBC will often be pursued by local actors. By contrast, in countries with a two-tier regional administration and a minor role for inter-local action (such as Italy or France), CBC will be a domain pursued by regional authorities.
CBRs in Europe: the evidence
The significance of CBRs is difficult to grasp without aggregate quantitative evidence. Important questions concern the number of existing initiatives, their institutional form, the type of participating actors, and the timing of current CBC initiatives. Existing sources, such as the CoE 'Handbook on Transfrontier Co-operation' (CoE, 1995) or a database compiled by the AEBR, give some indication. But these lists, as well as other sources, (9) suffer from imprecise definitions of CBC initiatives or CBRs and are therefore reliable only to a certain degree. The problem with providing quantitative evidence is that CBRs differ to an extraordinary degree. In response to this situation, a database on existing CBC initiatives was compiled by the author (see Table 3 ). A main source for the database was the list published by the AEBR but additional information was gathered inductively through the AEBR web site, AEBR and EU documents, the web sites published by CBC initiatives as well as extensive internet research and interviews with individuals involved in European CBC initiatives over the period 1998-2000. The database contains 73 valid entries and should provide a reasonably accurate picture of CBC in Europe at the time of writing. (10) In what follows, the quantitative dimensions of European CBC are analysed in light of the information provided in this database. Table 2 and 3 about here Factual information provided by the AEBR is used to assess the co-operation intensity of CBRs (Gabbe et al., 1999: 15) . Accordingly, 22 CBRs fulfil the criteria of being integrated micro-CBRs; in addition, eight Scandinavian cases can be categorized as 'Scandinavian Groupings', exhibiting high co-operation intensity but involving larger areas than the micro-CBRs. If one takes these cases together, 30 CBRs out of a total of 73 involve high co-operation intensity. Of the remaining 43 cases, 15 can be classified as Working Communities, i.e. large-scale co-operation initiatives that usually involve the participation of at least four regions. By contrast, 28 cases can be classified as low-intensity co-operation on a smaller scale ('emerging micro-CBRs') whereas the participating authorities can either be municipalities or regional authorities. If one puts aside the geographical scope of CBC initiatives and considers the nature of the participating actors, the results show that an initiative is more likely to have a high co-operation intensity if the protagonists are local rather than regional authorities. Out of 31 initiatives with a predominantly local character, 19 show a high degree of co-operation intensity whereas out of 42 arrangements initiated on the regional level, only 11 are characterized by high co-operation intensity. Closer examination reveals the relevance of the 'German factor'. Eighteen out of 28 cases with German participation show high co-operation intensity, in particular those along the Rhine axis in Germany's West and South, and 85 percent of all cases of high-intensity local co-operation involve German participation (see Figure 1) . Given the strong position of local government and the large size of the Länder, in Germany, the local level is predominant within CBC initiatives. In 20 of a total of 28 initiatives with German participation, the local level constitutes the main level of action, and in only two cases is a strong role of local government associated with low co-operation intensity. Similarly, the Scandinavian cases are in general characterized by high co-operation intensity, with a variable mix of local and regional authorities (counties) involved. By contrast, in countries such as Italy and France, the regional level is predominant because of the relative weakness of the local level, or the small territorial size of the meso-level of government (regions, provinces, etc.). The discussion below will address the institutional factors responsible for the high incidence of advanced CBC in Germany and Scandinavia. As far as the geographic distribution of CBC initiatives is concerned, almost half of the cases involve only EU territory, whereas a further quarter involve Swiss or Norwegian participation (see Figure 2) . Particularly in Switzerland, CBC has a long tradition with such longstanding initiatives as the Regio Basiliensis (around Basle) and the Conseil du Leman (Geneva). Approximately a fifth of the initiatives span the border between EU Member States and CEECs, the majority of them between Germany and Austria, on the one hand, and Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, on the other. There is also an increasing number of recent initiatives across CEEC borders, such as the Carpathian Euroregion. The analysis of the chronological patterns reveals that there were two periods when the number of CBRs rose sharply. By the mid-1970s, only 10 or so CBRs existed, but by 1980 their number had doubled to approximately 20 initiatives (cf. Figure 3 ). An even more pronounced boom set in from 1990 onwards, when the number of initiatives doubled from approximately 35 to the current number of over 70. The graph also reveals that the majority of initiatives founded between 1958 and 1990 can be classified as cases of high-intensity co-operation whereas the number of low-intensity cases grew more rapidly Figure 1 and 2 about here over the 1990s. Most of the low-intensity cases established in the 1970s were actually the Working Communities, whereas most of the more recent cases occur in Eastern and Central Europe. On average, high-intensity initiatives are 16 years old as opposed to a mere 10 years for low-intensity initiatives, pointing to a tendency for increasing cooperation intensity, at least for small-scale initiatives.
Discussion
The evidence shows that the 1990s in particular saw a strong rise in CBRs, especially micro-CBRs, in Europe. What are the driving factors behind this? The evidence suggests two major conclusions addressing two debated issues: (a) the impact of nation-state specific variables on the emergence and shape of CBC initiatives and (b) the impact of EU policies on CBC.
The impact of national differences
On the first point, the impact of nation-statespecific variables, notably the territorial organization prevailing in different countries, on the shape of CBRs is striking. Before going into detail, a methodological point is made to clarify how one should account for the impact of different nationstate institutions on the propensity and shape of CBC in the first place. One possible direction of inquiry is to use statistical methods for assessing the impact of specific variables. Östhol's (1996) analysis exemplifies this approach. He uses a 1991 database on border regions and CBC initiatives and identifies three possible causal factors responsible for the number of CBC initiatives affecting specific countries: (a) 'federal constitution', i.e. the extent to which the single countries are federal or unitary states; (b) 'centrality', i.e. the extent to which the single countries are economically central or peripheral; (c) EU-membership. According to Östhol's regression analysis, EU-membership and centrality are determining factors while federal constitution is not found to be significant. This approach has several weaknesses. First, the 'raw' LACE database is a rather unreliable and incomplete source of information as it contains both border authorities and cross-border bodies, allowing for a wide empirical range of cases. Second, Östhol's dichotomic classification of countries as federal/unitary or central/peripheral is rather arbitrary and does not allow one to account for truly Figure 3 about here institutional factors. Also, the territorial variable used, i.e. the number of 'border regions', is rather inconsistent because the number of 'border regions' varies with the geographic size of the regions in specific countries. In Germany, almost all Länder would be considered 'border regions', but this only reflects the fact that the Länder are particularly large compared to, say, the French régions or the Italian province or regioni. In Germany, it is typically local actors who are the driving force behind CBC and, thus, the number of border Länder in Germany can hardly be considered a determining variable. The general lesson is that any 'general theory' of CBC must be rejected as mechanistic and ahistorical. Some of the reasons for this are technical, i.e. there are relatively few cases and the data quality is questionable. But the main problem is that a complex process such as the formation of cross-border networks can hardly be operationalized through variables such as economic centrality or federal constitution. And even if the analysis was methodologically correct, the use value of a general theory of CBC remains limited as institutional factors will prevent such a theory from being applied to other areas, such as North America or South-East Asia. Qualitative institutionalist explanations of CBC will provide a better picture than purely quantitative methods of inquiry. I will illustrate this with the discussion of why German authorities are so prominent within European CBC. In particular, the 'micro-CBR' is clearly a predominantly German phenomenon. In over two-thirds of the cases, CBRs with a strong role of local government involve German participation. To a large degree, this is due to the strong position of the local level in German public administration, but also to the fact that the micro-CBR, understood as an institutional form, has been 'invented' in Germany and, for various reasons, enjoys a considerable legitimacy within the federalist German system. This is also reflected in the fact that co-operation has been in most cases chronologically preceded or at least accompanied by inter-state co-operation arrangements, such as the intergovernmental commissions. The institutional factors explaining the predominance of German CBRs with local participation can be summarized as follows. Of foremost importance is the administrativeinstitutional context in which the CBRs operate. In the German system, the two-level structure of local authorities -consisting of the municipalities on the one hand and district-type aggregations of municipalities (Kreise) on the other -facilitates collective action among municipalities. This allows the local authorities to collectively engage in strategies that are aimed at enhancing both their resource position and representation vis-à-vis the higher-level authorities. Similar conditions prevail in Scandinavia where a number of high-intensity cases can be found. Municipalities enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy in the Nordic countries and their policy repertoire has long included inter-municipal co-operation (BergmannWinberg, 1998). The dividing line between, on the one hand, Germany and Scandinavia, and countries such as Italy and France, on the other, reflects a typology of local government proposed by Page and Goldsmith (1987) . Accordingly, Northern European local government has higher margins of discretion and a broader set of responsibilities, backed up by locally raised resources, compared to Southern European local governments' lower levels of discretion and responsibilities. It appears that these institutional differences are partly responsible for the ability of local actors to group together and form strategic coalitions across borders. Put simply, CBC is more likely to be effective in countries with a strong tradition of communal autonomy. This is re-enforced by a benevolent attitude of higher-level authorities such as districts or regions towards inter-municipal co-operation in general and CBC in particular. One of the deeper reasons behind this is that communal co-operation, even across borders, is often seen as politically unproblematic while regional co-operation is more likely to be politically charged and therefore resisted by central state authorities. An example of such a situation is provided by the case of the Tirol Euroregion, a CBR involving the Austrian Land Tirol and the Italian provinces of South Tyrol and Trentino. The formation of the Euroregion has long been hindered by Italian central state authorities fearing that intensified co-operation would provide unwelcome political capital to the German-speaking political elite in South Tyrol, thereby possibly reenforcing separatist or autonomist tendencies. In Eastern Europe too, central state authorities have tended to keep tight control over EU-funded CBC initiatives with local and regional actors attempting to leverage co-operation to obtain more autonomy. The lesson from these cases is that CBC is less likely to flourish in politically charged situations, for instance induced by 'unjust borders' and divided ethnic minorities, as in the Tyrol case.11 By contrast, where suitable conditions for pragmatic cooperation and strategy formation on the municipal level prevail, CBC is more likely to be promoted by central state authorities.
The role of EU regional policy
The second main question I would like to address concerns the impact of supranational policy-making, notably EU regional policy, on European CBC. Commentators disagree whether the European Union should be considered as a driving force behind the emergence and proliferation of CBC across Europe. Anderson observes that, at first sight, the EU could be regarded as an important causal factor here, notably through the diminishing importance of borders, the growing regional representation at the supranational level and the Interreg programme (Anderson, 1997) . However, Anderson adds that the EU's impact is often overestimated as it disregards the fact that CBC initiatives are bottom-up driven. He notes that early initiatives such as the Regio Basiliensis (12) in the Upper Rhine area or the Working Communities in the Alps involved countries, such as Switzerland, that are not members of the EU. For instance, according to Anderson, in the German part of the Upper Rhine area, 80 percent of FDI is of Swiss provenence, and a cross-border labour market has emerged. Similar patterns occur in the Geneva area. Anderson's argument is that many CBC initiatives emerged as a response to growing cross-border functional interdependencies. Anderson is right regarding these early initiatives that emerged almost independently from each other in the late 1950s and 1960s. At that time, these initiatives received no financial support from supranational authorities, although their very possibility depended on the macro-regional integration driven through the CoE and the early European Communities. However, given the recent CBC boom, the argument must be qualified in several respects. First, the evidence supporting a connection between trade and functional links and the emergence of CBRs is weak. Some anecdotal evidence is provided by research on the intensification of economic cross-border contacts through CBC. In fact, even in CBRs that have existed for decades, such efforts have been successful only to a limited degree (Geenhuizen et al., 1996) . For instance, research on the Euroregion Maas-Rhine, the Euregio Rhine-Maas-Nord as well as the Dutch-Belgian CBRs indicates that the majority of firm contacts is still oriented towards their national economic spaces (Hamm and Kampmann, 1995; Hassink et al., 1995; Houtum 1997) . Second, the extraordinary growth of CBC from 1988 onwards must be related to the launch of EU support schemes. From 26 initiatives in 1988, when the Commission launched its first pilot projects, the number of CBRs almost tripled to over 70 in 1999. Evidence shows that the newly founded CBRs, for example those on the Eastern and Southern German borders, tend to be closely involved in Interreg implementation.13 There were no CBRs on the Austrian-German border before Austria's accession to the EU, but between 1994 and 1998 five new CBRs were established. Similar evidence can be provided for many Eastern and Central European CBC initiatives. For instance, the establishment of the 'Carpathian Euroregion' was considerably connected to its role in implementing Phare and Credo measures. The argument that targeted supranational policies are critical for the development of CBC is supported by the Scandinavian example where the Nordic Council has long been involved in facilitating and providing resources for co-operation initiatives. Third, the impact of EU policies can also be derived from the increasing similarity among CBC initiatives across Europe. It appears that the micro-CBR has become the standard model for pursuing CBC, and in this process, EU support certainly has an important influence. To cite the Austrian example again, Austrian Länder were involved in several Working Communities in the 1970s but small-scale CBRs were only established after 1994. (14) Since they have been established, many of the Working Communities have largely stagnated in terms of political importance and budgets, but the smaller micro-CBRs continue to flourish in part because they are more closely involved in the Interreg programme that only applies to narrow border areas. Leresche and Saez interpret the relative stagnation of the Working Community in terms of a 'crisis of governability' in cross-border governance. They emerged at a time when the limited problem-solving capability of the (central state driven) inter-governmental commissions became obvious but no alternative, decentralized governance mechanisms had yet emerged (Leresche and Saez, 1997) . Today, this alternative is provided by the institutional form of the micro-CBR. This growing isomorphism of CBC can also be illustrated with various examples of institutional transfer from Western Europe, in particular Germany and its western neighbours, to Eastern and Central Europe. (15) The Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) was significantly involved in establishing the CBRs on the German-Polish border in the early 1990s. The Carpathian Euroregion co-operates with the Euregio RheinMaas on the Belgian-German-Dutch border to design a cross-border development concept modelled after similar concepts implemented by the more advanced Western European CBRs. To conclude, the impact of EU support programmes can be ascertained in both quantitative and qualitative terms. On the one hand, they increased the incentives for establishing new CBC initiatives, particularly according to the micro-CBR model, from the late 1980s onwards, and, on the other, they helped to transform loose and poorly equipped communities into more institutionalized forms of co-operation (Schabhüser, 1993: 663) .
Conclusions
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the analysis presented. First, on a general note, it was shown that cross-border regions are part of the administrative landscape in most European border areas today. In the context of an increasing Europeanization and internationalization of noncentral governments, cross-border co-operation among contiguous local and regional authorities is only one special case among a variety of other such initiatives. As case studies show (Beck, 1997; Scott, 1998) , these co-operation initiatives tend to focus on public policy co-ordination, provided they manage to go beyond merely ceremonial declarations of common cross-border visions. Nation states have been reluctant to grant these new cross-border agencies more than the responsibility to carry out rather ordinary policy functions. In view of the lack of private actor involvement and the small size of true cross-border budgets, it is therefore premature to perceive CBRs as something akin to cross-border urban regimes (Harding, 1997) or new emerging scales of production and/or consumption (Brenner, 1999) . Second, these co-ordination and co-operation activities in the public policy realm are in the majority of cases linked to and promoted by the implementation of European regional policy, reflecting the analyses presented by other researchers (Anderson and Bort, 1997; Church and Reid, 1999) . This provides the main explanatory factor for the sharp rise in cross-border regions that has been witnessed over the 1990s, when the EU launched its large-scale programme to promote CBC (Interreg). By contrast, in the period before the isomorphic pressures of EU regional policy on local CBC initiatives became relevant, nation-statespecific variables played an important role in facilitating co-operation activities among border authorities. It was shown that the federalist set-up of German and, to an extent, Scandinavian, administration provided a fertile ground in this respect, particularly the two-tier structure of local administration that allows municipalities to engage in collective action to increase their bargaining power as well as their policy capacity vis-à-vis the Länder and the central state. Third, the analysis presented drew a distinction between various types of cross-border regions. From a longitudinal perspective, the rise of the micro-CBR as the predominant type of CBC compared to the relatively stagnating larger Working Community could be observed during the 1980s and 1990s. How can this be explained? The evidence points again to the role of EU regional policy in shaping this process. It appears that the micro-CBR, as an institutional form, is better suited to taking an active role in implementing EU policy measures than the larger Working Communities that suffer from coordination drawbacks due to the higher number of participating authorities as well as their diversity in terms of legal-administrative competencies. In this respect, it can even be argued that the institutional form of the micro-CBR evolved in a way that rendered it increasingly suitable to function as a dedicated implementation agency for EU measures in border areas (Perkmann, 2002a) . In other words, the proliferation of CBRs across Europe can be read as a process of institutional innovation through which these small-scale CBRs became a legitimate partner of the European Commission in implementing regional policy measures targeted at border areas. As related research has shown, this process was actively shaped by a transnational network of border region interests aggregated around the AEBR, acting as an institutional entrepreneur (Perkmann, 2002a) . The lesson from this is that the growing 'cross-borderization' in Europe does not necessarily point to an increasing territorial fragmentation of nation-state sovereignty. Rather, cross-border regions are to be interpreted as one among other forms of policy innovation triggered by the emergence of the EU as a supranational policy-maker that has no proprietary implementation apparatus. In this sense, small-scale CBRs in particular are part of the multi-level governance structure of EU policy-making but are far from posing an imminent threat to the authority of the member-states over these policies. 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 8 low intensity CBC high intensity CBC intergov. co-op.
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